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Abstract In recent years, an increasing number of games have created spaces 
which radically depart from our experience of space in reality. Digital games 
have used clandestine relocations of the avatar and semi-scripted reconfigura-
tions of game spaces to great effect. Often characterised as non-Euclidean, virtu-
al environments such as these foreground otherwise barely noticeable principles 
of navigation. Drawing on the well-established theories of game spatiality, neu-
roscience, and developmental psychology, this article investigates how two of 
the most well-known and extreme examples, Antichamber (Demruth 2013) and 
P.T. (7780s Studios [Kojima Productions] 2014), defamiliarize game spaces and 
their navigation. The result is an identification of shared aesthetic principles of 
non-Euclidean game spaces, which evoke fundamental disorientation and help-
lessness by withholding information we learn to rely on in reality at an early age 
for basic cognitive processes.
Keywords Aesthetics, multistability, game space, phenomenology, game design,  
neuroscience, horror games
Introduction
Spatiality was identified as one of the central challenges of digital games already in 
some of the foundational texts of game studies. Janet Murray (1998) assesses spatia-
lity as one of the four distinctive properties of virtual environments, while to Espen 
Aarseth, spatiality is even the “raison d’être” of computer games (emphasis in the ori-
ginal, 2001, 161). Unsurprisingly, games research has produced numerous typologies 
Hans-Joachim Backe: The Aesthetics of Non-Euclidean Game Spaces. Multistability and Object Permanence  
in Antichamber and P.T. In: Marc Bonner (Ed.): Game | World | Architectonics. Transdisciplinary Approaches  
on Structures and Mechanics, Levels and Spaces, Aesthetics and Perception. Heidelberg: Heidelberg University  
Publishing, 2021, p. 153–167. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17885/heiup.752.c10385
Hans-Joachim Backe154
(e.g. Nitsche 2008; Günzel 2008) and ontologies (Fernández-Vara, Zagal, and Mateas 
2007) of virtual environments and engaged with their aesthetics (Švelch 2008, 214; 
Fernández-Vara 2011). Other approaches put the player’s physical and psychological 
relation to virtual environments in the centre. Questions of embodiment and immer-
sion appear as particularly pertinent, both on the individual (Taylor 2003) as well as 
collective level (Babic 2007), because the experience of virtual environments is unlike 
that of reality or that of traditional depictions of space. A player of digital games “ex-
periences a phenomenon that cannot be experienced in traditional imaginative space, 
namely the experience of motion as navigation. […] Thus, […] computer games are 
characterized by the fact that they present artificial navigation” (Günzel 2008, 172).
The result is an aporia common to all research on virtual environments. Char-
acterised by “fundamental differences” (Nitsche 2008, 3) from what we encounter in 
reality, they are not spaces but a representation of space that is not in itself spatial, 
but symbolic and rule-based, or, in other words, “allegories of space,” “a three-dimen-
sional scheme carefully designed to offer a balanced challenge to the player” (Aarseth 
2001, 168). And still, these essential differences notwithstanding, players will inevita-
bly approach them based on (perceived) similarities to reality. Games do not reinvent 
patterns of spatial use but reuse, reapply and restructure basic patterns that occur in 
reality. The fundamental situations of play correlate with familiar spatial configurations 
because any environment is experienced based on what we do in it (McGregor 2007). 
The empirical observation that architectural theory and real-world facilitation of nav-
igation translate well to virtual environments (Totten 2014) has been theorised as the 
“shared fundamental experience of the way our knowledge of space develops both 
inside and outside of the video game” (Fraser 2011, 102).
How this transfer of knowledge from the real to the virtual works exactly is rarely 
foregrounded, while it is apparent that most games work towards making it effortless. 
Yet in dealing with virtual environments that depart from the parameters of reality in 
fundamental ways, the differences become unmistakable. The most well-known and 
well-researched departure from real life is the use of portals, warps, or wormholes 
(Gazzard 2009; Leirfall 2013), i.e. means of traversing space that have been theorised 
as well as depicted in fiction, yet have no equivalent in reality. Moving in this way 
disrupts the sequential fluidity of paths, temporarily takes navigational control from 
the player, and calls into question the coherence of time, space, and causality (Gazzard 
2009, 2). In Portal (Valve Corporation 2007), the prototypical example for games with 
such environments, the use of portaling is the central game principle, and accordingly 
follows static and predictable rules, derived quite faithfully from real-world physics. 
The spaces of Portal only change in ways that are compatible with our experience of 
spaces in reality, and generally do so in plain sight and with the cause of their reconfig-
urations (pistons, tracks, rails) exposed.
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Some games confront players with spatial situations that are cognitively different 
from spaces encountered in real life, and appear as featureless or impermanent. In 
doing so, they not only defamiliarize movement, but space itself. The game environ-
ments of the chosen examples—P.T. (7780s Studios [Kojima Productions] 2014) and 
Antichamber (Demruth 2013)—are sometimes called non-Euclidian to identify their 
deviation from real-world spaces.
The logic of space postulated by Euclid forms not only the fundamentals of ge-
ometry, but is at the root of conceiving of space as a neutral, static container with-
in which things happen. In mathematics, ‘non-Euclidean’ refers to the complications 
produced by curved surfaces, where the angles of a triangle add up to more than 180 
degrees (Hartshorne 2000). Non-Euclidean virtual spaces deviate from the laws of sim-
ple geometry in a different fashion. Most games resort to tricks of reconfiguring their 
game spaces, making things appear connected that are not, and teleporting the avatar, 
mostly to optimise performance, but do so without drawing attention to it. The games 
discussed here use the same techniques, yet instead of hiding them to make the game 
space appear more similar to reality than it actually is, they do the opposite: instead of 
streamlining the avatar’s progress, they have them move in circles. These spaces pro-
duce a very particular, primordial form of cognitive challenge. They are ontologically 
different, yet in a way that is not immediately apparent, and which undermines the 
player’s ability to use fundamental spatial epistemologies acquired as infants. What we 
encounter in these game environments therefore goes beyond disorientation or even 
cognitive dissonance (Cooper 2007). It is a throwback to a stage in child development 
before the attainment of object permanence.
In the following, I will briefly outline the challenges posed by the examples and 
discuss the pertinent game studies concepts, particularly uncertainty and agency. Hav-
ing thus identified the theoretical challenges, I will go into more detail with spatial 
epistemology, showing that there are recurring challenges posed by spatial multistabil-
ity and universal strategies humans develop early in life to cope with them. I will then 
return to the examples to discuss how they undermine said strategies and how this 
creates a very specifically unsettling feeling in players.
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Challenge Spaces to the Second Degree
 1 I apply the same approach and many of the same theories to further examples in a paper focus-
ing on the aesthetic potential of non-Euclidean spaces outside the narrative context of horror 
and existential dread (Backe 2020).
 2 For undisclosed reasons, Konami decided to withdraw P.T. from the PlayStation Store, the sole 
source of distribution, setting a precedent for a major publisher attempting to delete a game 
from public discourse, making the game an urban legend and turning PlayStation consoles with 
the 30-minute game installed a collector’s item with skyrocketing prices.
The digital games chosen for this article are by far not the only ones to exhibit the fea-
tures discussed here, yet they do so throughout the whole of their gameplay, and while 
one of them contextualises its spatiality within discourses of insanity, the supernatural, 
and the loss of cognitive faculties, the other presents its ever-changing environments 
as a given.1
P.T. was released as a platform-exclusive game on Sony’s PlayStation Store as a 
part of a mystery advertising campaign. Eventually, players realised that P.T. stood for 
‘playable teaser’ and was a preview for a new Silent Hill game.2 In its minimal game-
play, the player controls a first-person avatar whose abilities are restricted to walking 
and minimal interaction. Spawning in a bare concrete room with only one door, the 
player steps into an L-shaped hallway which leads past the locked front door of the 
house they are in, ending in a featureless room similar to the one they begin the game 
in. In this room, a short flight of stairs leads downward to another door. Stepping 
through it, the player finds their avatar back at the entrance of the L-shaped corridor. 
All of P.T.’s gameplay takes place in this strange spatial loop, varied through locked 
doors that can be opened by solving increasingly obscure puzzles, surrounded by grue-
some details, a haunting soundscape, and the occasional jump scare. The basis of the 
nightmarishness of the overall experience is, however, the unsettling space that appears 
to loop back on itself.
Antichamber, the second example, is a first-person game like P.T. or, maybe more 
accurately, like Portal, with which it shares the appropriation of the gun metaphor for 
different purposes. The player is trapped in a labyrinth of featureless white hallways, 
equipped with a gun-like tool that allows them to manipulate small, coloured cubes. 
Not only do the untextured white walls provide few landmarks for orientation, but 
walls and floors are impermanent and might manifest or disappear for a number of 
reasons, including whether or not they are being looked at. Gameplay revolves around 
navigation through the labyrinthine, shape-shifting hallways and activating mecha-
nisms, elevators, and doors by using the small coloured cubes to e.g. open doors. One 
of the first puzzles of the game is a staircase. No matter whether one takes the left 
downward path doused in deep red light, or the right upward path illuminated in blue 
light, the avatar ends up in a straight hallway that, after three right-angle bends, leads 
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back to the same staircase (» Fig. 1). The solution to the puzzle is to turn around and 
walk away because after taking the stairs once, the path behind the avatar has changed 
and now leads to a different, bright green archway. Antichamber achieves this and many 
of its other dazzling effects by teleporting the avatar in a way that goes unnoticed by 
the player, a technique used in countless other games as devices of convenience for 
developers. Yet, where other games use this technique as inconspicuously as possible, 
Antichamber uses it to thoroughly defamiliarize movement and spatiality. Throughout 
the length of its campaign, Antichamber exposes the artificiality of game environments 
as much as the fact that their traversal can pose a significant challenge in itself. Here, 
spatiality truly is the game’s “raison d’être.”
The spaces in P.T. and Antichamber are, of course, not unusual simply because 
they pose a challenge to the player. Challenge spaces are the first of six patterns of 
spatial use in digital environments identified by Georgia Leigh McGregor, and they 
are ubiquitous in games of all genres: “Problems of navigation and environmental ob-
stacles, whether they require a simulated physical response by the player’s avatar or an 
intellectual solution, are configurations of challenge space” (2007, 540). 
The difference lies in how they construct the challenge. Greg Costikyan has iden-
tified 11 distinct types of uncertainty in games, four of which we find in the spaces of 
the examples. Analytic complexity is present here, as in most challenge spaces, because 
sometimes, the spaces need to be approached like puzzles in that multiple elements 
Fig. 1 The initial stairwell in Antichamber.
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need to be evaluated both individually and in their relation toward each other to arrive 
at a single, non-obvious combination. Somewhat rarer for challenge spaces is hidden 
information, which to Costikyan is most commonly achieved through fog of war. To 
him, navigating such environments is an “exploration—but of the parameters of the 
system rather than of physical space” (2013, 93). What sets the spaces in the example 
games apart from traditional uses of fog of war is that the player’s exploration does not 
change the presentation of the world. Arriving at an understanding of how to navigate 
specific passages is traditionally paralleled with rendering this epistemological process 
palpable in a map or the world itself, which happens neither in P.T. nor Anticham-
ber, at least not in an unambiguous way. Through this, the games add an element of 
uncertainty of perception, “the difficulty of perceiving what’s going on in the game 
space” (ibid., 101). Even when the perception of things is not actively impaired, many 
game elements are characterised by semiotic contingency, forcing the player to perform 
considerable hermeneutic work to interpret the ambiguity of signs. So, while in most 
games “[m]ultiple paths, open landscapes and convoluted layouts require the player 
to negotiate and remember spatial configurations” (McGregor 2007, 540), P.T. and 
Antichamber are designed to complicate and even resist these basic problem-solving 
strategies.
In fact, even basic navigation is complicated in both games. In P.T., it is impossible 
to tell whether one walks in circles or moves through a series of nearly identical spaces. 
Antichamber adds to this by imbuing otherwise irrelevant parameters with meaning, 
like when a threshold can be crossed only while walking backwards. In both games, 
the environment withholds information about spatiality generally taken for granted, 
and thus becomes hard to “read,” in the sense that “players need accurate informa-
tion about their state in the game and will make choices based on that information” 
(Sicart 2013, 87). This feedback loop of receiving updates about the game state and 
acting upon it was influentially identified by Murray as the source of agency in virtual 
environments, “the satisfying power to take meaningful action and see the results of 
our decisions and choices” (1998, 126). Game designer Paolo Pedercini has suggested 
that the lowest level and the precondition of any deeper feeling of agency is the con-
trol of purposeful movement: “As long as the players feel in control of movements in 
space, even the most linear narrative and the most constrained level design will provide 
enough agency. In a way, that’s what we’ve come to expect from mainstream games” 
(Pedercini in Sicart 2013, 104). Withholding or disturbing agency has been identified 
as a powerful aesthetic strategy in digital games (Habel and Kooyman 2013; Wilson 
2003), yet the cognitive disenfranchisement of P.T. and Antichamber is unlike the frus-
tration of malfunctioning controls or work-like game mechanics used by other games 
(Johnson 2015). Here, players encounter less “the human pleasures of lack of agency, 
of being controlled, of being acted upon” (Giddings and Kennedy 2008, 30) than a 
fundamental sense of disorientation.
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Spatial Epistemology, Multistability, and Object Permanence
Yet, what are the principles commonly found in digital games that P.T. and Antichamber 
deviate from? The experience of space in digital worlds, just like that of time, is never 
isomorphic with reality. To this day, great conventionalisation dominates the design of 
game spaces even in Virtual Reality. Digital game worlds still customarily foreground 
similarities to real life architecture, movement, and social behaviour. The sense of spa-
tial presence “is best understood as the sense of being physically located in a virtual 
environment […] or interacting with virtual objects as though they have actual, phys-
ical properties” (Tamborini and Bowman 2010, 88). In other words, a virtual space is 
a combination of the generality of fundamental spatial articulations (figure-ground, 
solid-void) and the expressive, communicative specificity of a fleshed-out virtual envi-
ronment (Totten 2014, 104–12). The former organises and channels gameplay, while 
the latter creates meaning and atmosphere, effectively turning a space into a place: “A 
world with a properly defined sense of place is a world that players can learn to use” 
(ibid., 323). These two articulations of space are epistemologically different: the first we 
approach in the Euclidian tradition as an absolute, as a container, as “arrangements of 
bodies, a geometry of things in themselves” (Babic 2007, 2). The second, the details of 
an environment, is processed as a relational space as described by Henri Lefebvre, in 
which space does not exist a priori, “but only through the context given by the relations and 
interactions of the actors and objects within” (emphasis in the original, ibid., 2).
In one of the few dedicated studies of the epistemology of space in digital games, 
Benjamin Fraser posits that “the epistemological mode of video games is the epis-
temological mode of reality” (Fraser 2011, 95). He argues for an understanding of 
spatial epistemology in digital game environments as a form of mētis, the Ancient 
Greek concept of embodied, tacit knowledge of practices that are only learned through 
experience, not study. Fraser goes so far as to declare: “there is the shared fundamental 
experience of the way our knowledge of space develops both inside and outside of the 
video game. […] [T]he method through which we form knowledge of video game 
space is in fact the very method through which we form knowledge of ‘real world’ 
urban spaces” (ibid., 102–3).
Where Fraser foregrounds the similarities between our epistemologies of real and 
virtual spaces, Bjarke Liboriussen suggests that phenomenologically, the landscapes of 
games are experienced simultaneously as environments and images (2008). He draws 
on Jean Piaget to distinguish between three phenomenologically distinct levels of spa-
tiality: On the most basic level, termed topological space, an environment is perceived; 
if perception alone is insufficient, perception is augmented with imagination in a pro-
jective space that creates an idea of a place; on a yet higher level of abstraction, the 
metric space of a landscape is created purely through (in Piaget’s terms) imagination or 
(Liboriussen’s conceptual update) cognitive mapping (Liboriussen 2008, 152). 
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Subsuming these reflections, the understanding of and orientation in game 
spaces are crucial for exerting agency within them, and players process these spac-
es analogously to both their experience and mimetic depictions of reality. Being 
able to process the spaces of digital games explains how “my sense of embodiment 
can become distributed across both sides of the glass” (Keogh 2018, 4–5) to form 
an “amalgam embodiment in and as a part of the videogame performance” (ibid., 
28). Embodiment in a game world, particularly from the first-person perspective 
found in both examples, “might be called ‘whole body activity.’ This is to say that 
we humans are multidimensioned perceptually; that kinaesthetic-sensory actions 
are primary and implied in all our activities; and that this is the basis for what we 
take to be our opening or relation to any ‘real’ environment” (Ihde 2012, 134). For 
post-phenomenologist Don Ihde, “perceptual isomorphism” (ibid., 136) is the key 
to successful simulation environments in e.g. flight simulators. Ihde suggests that we 
switch our attention involuntarily back and forth between the virtual and the real 
embodiment in a quite classical form of bistability.
There are, however, two additional forms of multistability at work in navigating 
game spaces. Players ‘read’ the environment for directional and behavioural clues, in 
which the aesthetic dimension of elements often is what makes positions and paths 
memorable, and where different types of environmental (Jenkins 2004) or indexi-
cal (Fernández-Vara 2011) storytelling convey information that can simultaneously 
illuminate a fictional as well as the factual past of a game world and give the player 
valuable strategical clues. Both strategies are more closely related to the aesthetic mul-
tistabilities than the functional ones Ihde focuses on. Cognitive science indicates that 
both visual and semantic ambiguity are resolved through oscillation of focus (Yevin 
2006, 79). In the arts and literature, ambiguity stems from diverging—often even 
opposing—meanings that are produced by the same sign configuration, yet “accord-
ing to the common law of perception of ambiguous patterns, an oscillation of our 
attention takes place, and we see in turn either the actor or his role” (ibid., 81). The 
visual and semantic multistability of traditional aesthetics is therefore one of perceiv-
ing a static object in different, objectively co-present and therefore equally legitimate 
ways. In the bistability of alternating incorporation in the real and virtual body, both 
the player’s body and the configuration of their relationship to the virtual world are 
generally static and reliable. 
Non-Euclidean spaces in digital games exhibit additional spatial multistability: in 
them, navigational paths are not isomorphic with the perceived environment, and the 
objects change when interacted with or even just looked at. To return to the examples: 
P.T. has its players repeatedly walk through what both seems simultaneously the same 
and not the same corridor. On the most fundamental level, this is a simple variation 
of Euclidean logic: The hallway of P.T. appears to remain identical in form and shape 
while its contents change—space is an apparently neutral container. Moving down the 
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corridor, rounding its single corner, exiting the door on the far end, the player finds 
themselves stepping through the door into what appears to be the same corridor again 
(» Fig. 2). Disorienting as it is, this relocation might be shrugged off as a clandestine 
teleportation back to the entrance. There are, however, two complicating factors. The 
first is that the hallways always have the same layout, but differ in decoration and fur-
nishings. This can be explained either temporally—these changes happen in the time 
it takes to move from the exit back to the entrance—or spatially—there are not one, 
but many hallways.
The second complicating factor is the short flight of steps at the end of the corri-
dor, leading down into a windowless basement room. The players descend every time 
they reach the end of the corridor, which means that regardless of whether they per-
ceive one or several hallways, the path of the player character is a downward spiral 
(» Fig. 3). This is not only symbolically relevant—in the supernatural world of P.T., 
one would be hard-pressed to not understand this motion as a descent into madness or 
hell—but contributes to the disorientation the space evokes. The three conceptions of 
the space—an identical hallway undergoing changes through time, many nearly-iden-
tical hallways located in the same space, and a downward spiral of iterations of the 
same room—are three states of a multistable object.
Fig. 2  The individual corridor in P.T.
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The stairwell in Antichamber functions similarly, bringing the player back to where 
they started after walking downward or upward. While the navigational path and per-
ceived space are anything but isomorphic in both cases, the geometry of the space 
is less defamiliarizing than that of P.T. Here, the player rounds three corners before 
returning to their starting point, thus preserving at least correct directionality. Whilst 
P.T. unsettles the player through sometimes minute changes in the interior’s arrange-
ment between different versions of the hallway, Antichamber omits any and all detail. 
Untextured white walls make it impossible to distinguish one from another, turning 
the interspersed coloured lights into abstract, unambiguous markers of particularity. 
The only elements of the game world the player has direct agency over are coloured 
cubes which can be used for many purposes, from activating switches to building walls 
or platforms. They are, however, highly impermanent and evaporate under a number 
of circumstances. Even some walls, floors, and ceilings have varying solidity depending 
on e.g. whether the player is looking at them or not. Most of the game’s doors will 
close behind the avatar, but in many cases, it is nearly impossible to determine when 
Fig. 3  The string of corridors forming  
a downward spiral P.T.
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their threshold is crossed, i.e. how far into a corridor the avatar can safely move before 
blocking off the way back. The only way to grasp the details of geometry in this case is 
to keep the gaze fixed on the door and move in the smallest possible increments, and 
to eventually mark the point of no return or block the door with one of the game’s us-
er-manipulable cubes. Only then may the player feel safe in turning their avatar’s back 
to the door in question, by virtue of having reaffirmed object permanence. All these 
actions produce, however, only what might be oxymoronically called temporary per-
manence as the in-game objects the player controls, the cubes, are impermanent and 
will be removed from the avatar’s inventory in airlock-like transitory spaces and more 
importantly, reset to their original positions upon the avatar’s (very frequent) respawns.
The result of this combination of featurelessness and constant change is a form 
of multistability that differs fundamentally from the visual and semantic forms, which 
rely on the perception of a static object in different, equally meaningful ways. The 
profoundly unsettling effect of these environments results from an ambiguity that can-
not be resolved with familiar methods because the multistability of the object is not 
perceptual but ontological.
Differently put, the objects encountered in non-Euclidean game spaces lack per-
manence, and thus subvert one of the first principles humans rely on in their “striving 
to preserve order and coherence in the world” (Moore and Meltzoff 1999, 641). Ob-
ject permanence is generally assumed to be acquired by humans in their second year 
of life,3 at which point infants begin to “parse multiple appearances as manifestations 
of a single underlying individual […] Both classifying groups of entities and tracing 
the identity of individuals over time and space are effective in isolating invariants and 
reducing apparent multiplicity” (ibid.). The cognitive processes of parsing the world 
for variants and invariants are so complex that they lay the groundwork for many 
advanced cognitive processes we only learn much later: “Infants do not at first under-
stand that material objects, qua objects, are permanent, but rather discover that certain 
transformations are ones that preserve permanence” (ibid., 642). Among the connect-
ed cognitive developments are an understanding of cause and effect as well as of the 
agency of others (Piaget 2013, 378).
With regard to the examples, object permanence is tangibly undermined when 
the player has to keep the avatar’s gaze directed at an object in order to make sure 
that it does not disappear—exactly what we learn as infants to be unnecessary and 
precisely not an act imbued with agency. These spaces are ontologically multistable, 
changing from one spatial configuration to another, defying Euclid’s assumption of 
spatial stability. As the identity of objects, cause and effect, and agency are apparently 
 3 There is some debate about the average age and the mode of attaining object permanence. Given 
the inevitable methodological challenges (Krøjgaard 1998) of the topic, “[i]nfant object perma-
nence is still an enigma after four decades of research” (Moore and Meltzoff 1999, 623).
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deeply connected with object permanence, the shared aesthetic of non-Euclidean game 
worlds comes into clear focus. Non-Euclidean games connect these factors through 
their spaces and undermine some of our most fundamental heuristics for meaning 
making, acquired in early childhood. They confront their players with environments 
that are not permanent, lack uniquely identifying traits, and thus make it difficult to 
even identify the starting position of the avatar, let alone to navigate through complex 
environments. Intentional movement becomes impaired, leading to a loss of agency 
(Sicart 2013, 104).
Conclusion
When game spaces deny players the ability to navigate them reliably by withholding 
immutable rules, they not only undermine one of the most fundamental aspects of 
the game, spatial navigation, but impede players’ general ability for reasoning. Even 
though Antichamber allows its players to identify logical solutions to its spatial config-
uration (by thinking outside the proverbial as well as, in this case, very literal box), it 
introduces additional difficulty in this process by suggesting to its players that not only 
pre-formed behavioural patterns may not be applicable, but that the methods by which 
we have formed them as children (and which are the basis for all our rational thought) 
may no longer hold. This is, without any apparent similarity to what we would nor-
mally call a horror game, a profound unsettling that has the potential to induce sub-
lime terror in the players—a potential fully realised in P.T. to horrendous effect.
In stripping us of our ability to trust in object permanence, the games discussed 
here do more than create a playful navigation of game spaces. They go beyond cogni-
tive dissonance in defamiliarizing space and throw us back cognitively to a past stage 
in child development, robbing us of some of our most essential, most fundamental, 
and most relied-upon means of dealing with the world. By confronting us with spaces 
that withhold our primary cognitive achievement, object permanence, we are left with 
trial and error, the preceding phase in child development, and later on forced to do 
non-Euclidean mental mapping—to transcend our established navigational faculties 
for a heightened sense of accomplishment. So, despite their difference, both examples 
have a shared aesthetic: fundamental cognitive defamiliarization.
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Figures
 Fig. 1: Screenshot by the author (Demruth 2013).
 Fig. 2–3: Graphic by the author.
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